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ABSTRACT: In this paper we present the concept for reliable vehicle-autarkic collision 
detection developed for a Rail Collision Avoidance System (RCAS) that is based on direct 
train-to-train communication. Similar to existing systems in air and maritime transport, the 
RCAS approach allows vehicle-autarkic detection of imminent collisions. Designed as a 
safety overlay system, it shall warn and advise train drivers in such situations. Broadcasted 
messages shall allow each railway vehicle to assess the traffic situation in its vicinity under all 
operational conditions. Apart from an onboard localization unit, which relies on satellite 
navigation signals, the system architecture does not require any other infrastructure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Actual statistics of the International Union of Railways (UIC) show that there are three 
significant train accidents in Europe every day [1], despite of millions of Euros which have 
been invested in trackside and in-train safety equipment. 
Most of the catastrophes in railroad transport are caused by collisions [2]. Today, only the 
operation center has an overall overview of the traffic situation, and a train driver has to be 
informed of a hypothetical collision by the operation center staff. Even with Automatic Train 
Control (ATC) systems like the future European Train Control System (ETCS) a significant 
amount of collisions cannot be prevented, because they occur between trains and other kinds 
of obstacles like construction vehicles, construction workers or pedestrians and vehicles on 
level crossings. 
While maritime, air, and road transport have a vehicle integrated collision avoidance system 
available or in the development phase [3], there is no satisfying solution of this type of 
technology in railway transportation. Usually such systems rely on position determination and 
direct communication among vehicles.  
 
2. TRAIN-AUTARKIC COLLISION AVOIDANCE  
 
Alike we propose a Rail Collision Avoidance System (RCAS), that operates autonomous. For 
this purpose each railroad vehicle shall be equipped with onboard sensors that provide 
updated Position, Velocity and Time (PVT) information. PVT and additional data is then 
regularly broadcasted to all other RCAS equipped units in the surrounding. By analyzing the 
received messages from other units the complete traffic situation can be assessed, thereby 
allowing the warning and advising of a train driver in case of a collision threat, long before 
the danger is visible and early enough to completely avoid it. 
While the principle of infrastructure-less vehicle autonomous collision avoidance is well 
established in aeronautics, as well as it is the case in maritime transport with the AIS 
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(Automatic Identification System), none of the existing systems is applicable to railway 
transport, because of its very specific boundary conditions: 
 
1. Movement patterns are highly deterministic because of the guidance by the rails. In 
conflict situations a train driver can only break or accelerate. The switches are 
controlled by the railway control centre only. 
2. Movement vectors which are in line can also occur in nominal conditions e.g. when 
trains are coupled or when one train overtakes another one on a double track line. 
Moreover, the tracks are very close, which requires highly accurate position 
determination. 
3. Punctually there are very high user densities in a railway network like e.g. at large 
shunting yards. Because the available frequency band is limited, in such areas the 
resulting high data rate must not degrade the reliability of message transmission.  
4. Lines are sometimes under ground (tunnels), under roofs in train stations or they pass 
through dense forests and hilly areas. Such topological scenarios are challenging with 
respect to the required range of the direct train-to-train communication as well as for 
GNSS satellite signal reception. 
3. DETECTION OF RAILROAD TRAFFIC CONFLICTS 
In railroad transport well-defined collision scenarios can be distinguished in different modes 
of operation. In Figure 1 the situation is illustrated for a head-on, a rear-end and a flank 
collision scenario. In terms of requirements on the range of the train-to-train communications 
link, the first one is the most demanding, since the remaining braking distances decrease for 
both trains according to their momentary speed. 
 
     
Figure 1: Head-on, rear-end and flank collision scenarios in railroad transportation. 
 
In a first analysis published in [4] we investigated different topological scenarios, that 
describe the different parts of the whole railway network, and identified regional lines, train 
stations and shunting yards as those scenarios which are relevant for the RCAS system design. 
Main lines with high speed services are not considered, because there the safety level is 
already very high due to extensive technical equipment and train control mechanisms. 
For the listed scenarios the maximum speed is 160 km/h. In case of emergency braking the 
maximum braking distances are in the order of 1 km. Depending on the weather and rail 
conditions this can increase due to reduced fraction. Moreover, to allow for a secure (non 
passenger imperilling) braking of fast passenger trains, up to 2 km are necessary with the 
corresponding brake configuration. For the head-on collision scenario this means we need to 
guarantee a communication range of at least 5 km and need to have a high message repetition 
rate [5] to loose a minimum of braking distance when the two trains approach the 
communication range.  
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3.1. RCAS System architecture 
 
On board of each rail vehicle an intelligent RCAS unit is foreseen, comprising a transceiver 
and a processor unit as illustrated in Figure 2. For accurate track resolving localization, a 
combination of GNSS receiver, odometer and eddy current sensor can be used [6]. The last 
one not only improves the accuracy along the track by detecting rail clamps, but also allows 
identification of switches and the switch stand by unique signatures. Aided by an electronic 
map this guarantees precise PVT information even in tunnels, under roofs of train stations and 
in shunting yards.  
In order to avoid collisions by overlapping cargo, to survey the catenary and the track, or to 
monitor the end of the train, a camera can be installed and connected to provide additional 
safety relevant information. Furthermore, an interface to an electronic schedule like the 
German EBuLa can give information on the planned route and speed of the train. In the future 
ETCS will even support online updates on this data. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: RCAS system unit architecture. 
 
The core of the system is an algorithm analyzing the received information from other trains 
together with the PVT and train data of its own carrier. Thus it allows to advise the train 
driver against a potential collision, or even to initiate braking to avoid it. 
 
3.2. Vehicle-autarkic collision detection 
 
Each RCAS unit produces messages with a fixed length. These messages are transmitted with 
a variable rate in a broadcast mode depending on the own speed and the traffic situation in the 
vicinity. The net size is of the RCAS messages is 150 bits. For the proposed format we refer 
to [5]. First of all the message type indicates the format of the Position and Route Information 
(PRI) block. If there is a track selective position information present, the track ID, the 
distance from the tracks starting node, the movement direction and, if available, the 
information on the planned route are transmitted. Alternatively latitude, longitude and heading 
are broadcasted. The train ID includes information about its operator, the type of train or 
vehicle and its danger status. The type of train information enables prioritization of e.g. a 
passenger train that passes a shunting area. The danger status can be used to notify others of 
an extended loading gauge or if dangerous goods are carried. The current speed, an estimate 
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of the braking distance, and the forward and backward length of the train with respect to the 
localization unit are included in the message to allow other trains to identify potential 
collision points and to determine where and when warnings and braking advisories must be 
initiated. 
The most important property of a collision avoidance system is its reliability in detecting 
collisions in time. Moreover we must guarantee that regular operation conditions do not lead 
to warnings, because this would slow down train runs. Moreover, regular false alarms would 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Contingency table for a collision detection algorithm. 
 
cause train drivers’ to mistrust the system and eventually to ignore it. That means we have to 
minimize missed alarms (false positive) and minimize false alarms (true negative) as 
illustrated in the contingency table in Figure 3. This goal is particularly difficult to achieve in 
railway transportation. Imagine a single track line with a passing point at a small station, 
where two railcars are approaching, or one has already stopped in the station. 
In order to distinguish collision scenarios from regular operation, it is very helpful to look at 
the estimated braking distances. In regular operation there is always enough margin to allow 
for a dosed braking. Thus, if the distance to another train on the same route approaches the 
sum of the braking capability limits of both trains, the RCAS system shall act. 
 
Alert and advisory (command) concept: 
Because of the relatively high speeds of trains and the long braking distances, an alert and 
advisory (or command) concept, similar to the aeronautical TCAS, promises a major safety 
gain. In the first step a Traffic Alert (TA) signal shall warn the train driver in case of a 
detected close approach to another RCAS unit on a collision course. TA will be activated with 
a fixed time Alertt  prior to the time when the train has to start braking, given that it proceeds 
with the momentary speed. Thus, the train driver is prepared to receive a Braking Command 
(BC) in a second step, which is signaled after Alertt  seconds in order to avoid the collision. 
As an example Figure 4 illustrates this concept for the front collision scenario. The distance 
between TA and BC is given by ( )Alert AlertD v v t= ⋅ . To allow for a safe braking, a guard 
distance ( )GuardD v  is added to the braking distance ( )BrakeD v  to assure that the trains come to 
a full stop under all environmental conditions. 
 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of Traffic Alert (TA) and Braking Command (BC) concept. 
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Braking distance estimation: 
The braking distance of each train mainly depends on the following parameters: Speed, slope 
of the track, brake type, brake configuration, number of axels, and ratio braking weight to 
train weight. While the track slope is provided by the electronic map, all other parameters are 
train or vehicle specific parameters which are either pre-assigned or they can be determined 
by sensors.  
An estimate of the braking distance Bs  can be calculated with e.g. the Mindener equation [7] 
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where 0v  is the speed at the start of braking, ψ , 1c  and 2c  are higher order function of 0v  
which depend on the brake type, brake configuration and number of axels, mi is the mean 
slope of the track, and λ is the percentage of brake power (ratio braking weight to train 
weight). Equation (1) is valid for passenger trains only. For a modified version of (1) 
addressing freight trains and for more details on the parameters we refer to [7]. To calculate 
the total braking distance BrakeD  we need to add the distance depending on the reaction time 
Reactt  of the train driver: Brake React BD v t s= ⋅ + .  
Although such calculations can provide good estimates and one can even think of expanding 
the model to take e.g. aging of brakes into account, the real braking distance might vary due 
to the fact that adhesion and friction between wheels and rails are changing depending on the 
environmental conditions, which are difficult to be quantified. In order to minimize false 
alarms in regular operation conditions and to efficiently use the track infrastructure, the 
braking distance shall not be overestimated. On the other hand, an underestimation of the 
braking distance would cause collisions at low speed. Therefore we propose to add a guard 
distance GuardD  as depicted in Figure 4. 
Under the assumption, that all involved vehicles are aware of the critical situation, that means 
we can guarantee that the communication range CommD  is larger than the sum of the total 
braking distances (see Figure 4), we can further assume, that all train drivers will follow a BC. 
That means each involved vehicle is able to determine a common point on the track (crash 
symbol in Figure 4), where it must come to a full stop. This finally leads to the absolute 
points on the track for TA and BC signaling. 
 
The main drawback of the Mindener equation is that it is not suited to perform detailed 
position, speed and acceleration over time analysis. In order to precisely determine evolution 
of position, speed and acceleration a new approach based on a three stage braking process 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Three stage process modeling the brake behavior of trains, e.g. for max 1.2b = m/s2. 
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shown in Figure 5 is developed. Brakes do not apply immediately but have a certain response 
time. After this response time the air leaves the brake pipe gradually and the brakes start 
applying. This is the development stage which is given by the Development Time and after 
that full braking pressure is applied on the wheels and the train decelerates with braking 
retardation maxb . We chose standard values of 10 seconds for the response time and 15 
seconds for the developing time for the following analysis.  
As next step we performed a simulation comparing the three stage braking model and the 
Mindener equation, seeking the best relation between the percentage of brake power λ  and 
the maximum braking retardation maxb . By adjusting the maximum braking retardation maxb   
we calculated the braking distance over speed that approximates the Mindener equation from 
an MSE point of view, shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of braking distance over initial speed between simulated three-stage 
braking and the Mindener equation estimate forλ =170 (brake config. ‘P’, 90 axels, mi = 0). 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Distance deviation of the fitted three-stage braking model from the Mindener 
equation estimate for different values of the percentage of brake power λ . 
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Repeating this process for different λ  and approximating with a second order polynomial, 
yields to 5 2 3max  ( ) 2.326 10 4.434 10 0.109b f λ λ λ− −= = ⋅ + ⋅ + . Nevertheless, a remaining 
error exists between both curves. This speed dependent deviation is shown in Figure 7 for 
different values of the percentage of brake power. In a final step this deviation can be 
additionally considered in the guard distance, to correct for it. 
 
Analysis of the dynamic behavior: 
An analysis of the dynamic behaviour for two trains driving on a head-on collision course was 
performed, using this three-stage braking model on each train. Simulations revealed a great 
improvement in the accuracy of the computation of the estimated collision point (ECP) when 
the past dynamic behaviour of a train is taken into account. Figure 8 shows the space-time 
curves of two trains separated 3000 meters from each other. The black curves represent the 
assumption that each train is going to continue moving with the current speed. The 
intersection of these lines represents the estimated collision point in that case. Furthermore we 
can account for the extreme cases where the train starts accelerating with full power around  
 
 
 
Figure 8: Space-time diagram of two trains in a head-on collision scenario with both trains 
initially accelerating. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Space-time diagram of two trains in a head-on collision scenario with one train 
initially decelerating. 
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0.5 m/s2 (blue curves), which would be a worst case assumption, or if it would brake with full 
braking retardation around 0.6 m/s2, giving the grey area in Figure 8 with all possible ECP’s. 
When the train is already immersed in a braking process, like it is the case in the example in 
Figure 9, the ECP computed with a constant velocity assumption can lie outside the grey area. 
To overcome this problem the assumption that the trains keep their acceleration/deceleration 
in the future was followed and showed best results in simulations (red lines in Figure 8 and 
Figure 9). This assumption rests on the fact that trains are usually not changing their 
accelerating/brake profile abruptly. Especially in regular operational scenarios where rear-end 
and flank collisions are threatening, the reliability in detecting collision and at the same time 
the prevention of false alarms can be drastically improved taking a three-stage braking model 
and the actual acceleration/deceleration status into account. 
Since information about the switch stands on the track ahead are in general not 
available/reliable, the here presented approach is applied to assess the conflict potential of all 
trains that have a common track ahead within the RCAS communication range. 
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
In this paper we presented a novel concept for reliable conflict detection in rail-bound 
transportation based on a train control overlay system exploiting direct train-to-train 
communications. The content of the broadcasted messages allows each railway vehicle to 
assess the traffic situation in its vicinity. The presented conflict detection concept provides 
instant information to train engine drivers in case of imminent collisions and many other 
threats on railroads that cause most of the accidents today. At the same time it allows for a 
more efficient use of rail infrastructure in the future.  
In the future we plan to further improve the performance of the RCAS collision detection 
algorithm by taking additional information from the track map, e.g. changing slops or 
physical speed limits in ahead lying track sections, into account. 
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